usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load
authorMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Thu, 3 Apr 2014 16:52:25 +0000 (19:52 +0300)
committerJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Mon, 5 May 2014 20:15:03 +0000 (22:15 +0200)
commit9f8e9895c504149d7048e9fc5eb5cbb34b16e49a
tree4d13c798595979f4650e00acfb74a03fc54047da
parent3476436a44c29725efef0cabf5b3ea4e70054d57
usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load

CVE-2013-4541

s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as
size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit
this to load arbitrary data.

setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure
they are not negative.

Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
hw/usb/bus.c